Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate
Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers
Christopher B. Mueller∗
Daubert is one of the more important decisions of the twentieth
century because it changed fundamentally the relationship between
1
law and science. Prior to Daubert, the law deferred to the scientific
community on the question whether answers that scientists provide
are sufficiently grounded in theory and practice to be trusted and
acted upon by courts.
After Daubert, judges are charged
independently to appraise what science has to offer, in effect
screening out evidence offered as science if it is invalid or unreliable.
To put it another way, a pre-Daubert judge who might have
hesitated to exclude what seemed to be testimony on a matter of
science could say, in effect, “it is not the court who rejects what you
say, but other experts in your field.” A judge fearful of criticism for
admitting such testimony could say, in effect, “it is not the court who
endorses what this expert has to say, but credentialed people in a
recognized discipline.” A post-Daubert judge has less room to hide. If
he excludes evidence proffered as science he is expected to say “the
court finds that what you say is not sufficiently grounded in theory or
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (noting that FRE 702
superseded the Frye standard; under FRE 702, scientific evidence must be valid in the
sense of being reliable and must “fit” the case and, even if the evidence does satisfy
these requirements, it is subject to the possibility of exclusion under FRE 403) (citing
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (adopting what has come to
be known as the “general acceptance” standard)).
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practice,” or “lacks sufficient basis in fact” or “lacks sufficient
connection to the case at hand.” A post-Daubert judge who admits
such evidence is expected to say “the court finds that indeed this
testimony is properly grounded in theory and practice, and
adequately based on the facts and sufficiently related to the task at
hand.” To be sure, Daubert still leaves room to hide. Factors like
2
“peer review” and “general acceptance” provide opportunities, as
does the possibility of invoking FRE 403, and a judge can also
distance himself by casting his decision in terms of “adequate
3
assurances” or “inadequate assurances” of validity.
The basic point, however, is that Daubert puts judges into the
4
position of judging science. That makes Daubert revolutionary.
Criticisms of Daubert abound, particularly in toxic tort cases.
Perhaps such criticisms are inevitable when a single case so
profoundly changes the legal landscape. The most serious criticisms
are advanced from three perspectives: One is epistemological and
structural (or “political” in the fine sense of the term). This criticism
holds that judges are not much more able than juries to appraise
proof offered as science, and that attempts to exercise the
“gatekeeping” role infringe on the powers and responsibilities of
juries to act as factfinders.
Another criticism is pragmatic,
substantive, and to some extent ideological. This criticism holds that
judges applying Daubert are throwing out too much good evidence
proffered by civil claimants in toxic tort cases.
A third is
philosophical. This criticism holds that Daubert misunderstands
science.
What follows is a defense of Daubert against these criticisms,
followed by a suggestion of my own, which is that the Daubert
revolution would achieve more if appellate courts abandoned the
2

For an argument that “peer review” is not what it is cracked up to be, see Joelle
Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of the Fact-Based
Reliability Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. __ (upcoming in Fall 2003).
3
See generally Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining
“Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 317 (2001) (arguing that
judges should not determine “whether the explanative theory actually works” to
produce an accurate conclusion, but “whether there are sufficient assurances” that it
does).
4
One crude measure of Daubert’s impact can be seen just by glancing at citation
history. In the 38 years between 1945 and the decision in Daubert in 1993, Frye was
cited in approximately 260 reported federal cases and 800 reported state cases. As of
this writing, Daubert is almost ten years old. As of January 25, 2003, Daubert has been
cited in nearly 2,500 reported federal cases and 1,200 reported state cases, while Frye
has been cited in approximately 270 reported federal cases and 1,000 reported state
cases.
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abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing the rulings of trial judges in
this area. To be fair, I should note that most critics have not called
for the abandonment of Daubert and few would endorse a return to
the Frye standard. Casting the criticisms in their best light, their aim
is to improve Daubert, an undertaking that I gladly join. This essay
5
addresses civil rather than criminal cases, and scientific evidence
rather than “experiential expertise,” even though this dichotomy is
hard to draw and counts for less than it once did because the Daubert
6
standard applies to all expertise.
I. JUDGES CAN DO BETTER THAN JURIES: DAUBERT GATEKEEPING MADE
REAL
In a nutshell, Daubert is the right standard because it asks directly
the question that Frye put only indirectly, and thus puts courts in a
better position to arrive at satisfactory answers. The central issue is
scientific “validity,” and the criteria suggested by Daubert are useful in
resolving that issue.
Here it is worth pausing to ask some pragmatic questions: Why
have a validity standard to begin with? Why not simply approach
science with the kind of openness suggested by FRE 702 on its face?
In other words, why not simply admit scientific evidence if it seems
relevant and helpful and the witness is qualified?
The answer given by the Court is more positivist than policybased. FRE 702 requires science to satisfy a validity standard, so courts
are bound to scrutinize such proof. That answer is unsatisfactory
because it does not emerge from the “plain meaning” of FRE 702 or
even a reasonable interpretation of the Rule’s language. The Court
has acknowledged that the Rules did not displace all prior evidence
5

I’ve heard enough from able commentators, including Professor Risinger, to
be convinced that courts are too credulous with purported scientific evidence in
criminal cases. Daubert seems to have exposed the soft underbelly of forensic science,
and I think that judges, to the extent they see the problem, are troubled more by the
prospect that the system will break down than by the prospect that unreliable
evidence is being used to convict. There is such a thing as too much revolution, and
the impact of Daubert in criminal cases has yet to be worked out in a satisfactory way.
6
See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“Daubert’s general
holding . . . applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to
testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge” under FRE 702).
For an effort to develop standards, consistent with Kumho and Daubert, by which the
validity of nonscientific expertise might be appraised, see Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the
Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2293 (1994)
(stating that a trial judge can exclude experiential nonscientific expertise when it is
based on no experience or only limited experience, and when the experience is too
dissimilar from the issues at hand).
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doctrine, and this point is critical to another major holding. The
conclusion in Daubert rests on the notion that the word “scientific” as
used in FRE 702 is a rich or deep normative term that implies a
standard of legitimacy. It is of course astonishing, if we suppose that
this meaning really is to be found in FRE 702, that nothing in
legislative background supports this reading (in fact the term seems
merely descriptive). In truth, the Rules provide no compelling basis
for discarding the old Frye standard. What we now call the Daubert
standard is in reality judge-made law disguised as something else.
That is not to say that I disapprove of the decision, for the opposite is
true: I think Daubert represents an advance, that it is at least
consistent with the elastic contours of FRE 702, and that it good
8
lawmaking, even if disingenuous in its logic.
But there are questions that should be asked before reaching
that conclusion: Should we have such a standard? Does it make the
law better? Keeping the focus on civil cases, my answer is yes.
I think that three facts of modern life conspire to suggest that we
need a validity standard: First, we ask courts to resolve difficult
technical and scientific issues. Second, much scientific knowledge is
fluid and contestable, inaccessible to laypeople, hard to understand,
and qualified in ways that elude ordinary experience and intuitions.
Third, our adversary system places primary responsibility for
gathering and presenting evidence in the hands of the parties, and
creates incentives that lead to risks.
What we see is something like this: Complex questions arise,
which can be answered, if at all, only by calling on scientific expertise.
A salient modern example is the question of causation in the toxic
tort setting. Parties and courts look to science for the answer.
Lawyers on each side find experts who agree to help for a price. The
issue is joined, and we discover that there is no definitive answer and
only partial information—studies and theories, usually involving
7

See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984) (explaining that the drafters of
the Rules could not have intended to “scuttle entirely” the practice of crossexamining to show bias, even though they offer no “express treatment” of the
subject); see also Edward Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978) (stating that after adoption of the Rules, “no common
law of evidence remains,” at least “in principle,” but “in reality” the situation is
different, because “the body of common law knowledge continues to exist” in the
“somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers”) (internal citations omitted).
8
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986) (contrasting, inter alia,
law as pragmatism with law as integrity, meaning that judges seek to resolve hard
cases by some “coherent set of principles” in order to make the “complex structure”
of law and politics “the best these can be”).
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some combination of chemical structure analysis, animal tests,
epidemiology, and/or “differential diagnosis.” None of the proof
either does or can answer directly the question of individual causation
(“specific” causation). Instead, such proof shows a possibility, and
perhaps sometimes a probability, of causation in an individual case by
suggesting that the substance in question can or does cause some
ailments in some people (“general” causation) or by suggesting that
no other explanation is likely (differential diagnosis testimony).
What can courts reasonably do? Here is one possibility: Courts
can suppose that the data and conclusions presented by qualified
experts reflect valid science, upon which our system can reasonably
allow a jury to rely in rendering a verdict for or against recovery in
some very substantial amount. That seems close to the view in
jurisdictions that admit scientific evidence on the basis of a
credentials test coupled with findings that the proof is relevant and
9
helpful. But there is another possibility, which seems more realistic:
We can make the judgment that not all evidence that is presented as
science, even by qualified witnesses, is of such quality that it can be
relied upon to make serious decisions of the sort required for civil
judgments. We can believe that such evidence varies in quality, and
that sometimes it is not reliable enough. We can suppose that gaps in
scientific understanding create room for interpretive disagreement,
and that financial incentives, whether arising from the involvement of
scientists in commercial or other funded projects or from their
involvement in litigation, can compromise expert testimony. We can
believe that science, like law, leaves room for principled intellectual
disagreement that reflects differences in technical understanding or
personal philosophy. We can also suppose that these differences
sometimes lead to errors or to conclusions that cannot be defended
or would be condemned by most others of similar training.
Obviously, Daubert reflects the latter view of science, and I think that
is the more realistic view.
There is yet another question. Should we charge judges to be

9

See, e.g., State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867, 871-73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (following
neither Daubert nor Frye; in applying WRE 702, the trial judge is limited to
considerations of relevancy, qualifications of the witness, whether the evidence is
superfluous or will waste time or resources, whether probative value is outweighed by
prejudice, whether jury can draw its own conclusions, whether the evidence is
inherently improbable, and whether the area is suitable for expert opinion); Green
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 890 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that unlike Daubert jurisdictions, where “the trial court has a significant ‘gatekeeper’
function in keeping from the jury expert testimony that is not reliable, the trial
court’s gatekeeper role in [this state] is extremely limited”).
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the gatekeepers, or should we fold the gatekeeping responsibility into
the factfinding responsibility, leaving the assessment of science to
juries? As others have suggested, the right approach is to ask this
question: Are judges more capable than juries of playing this role? In
his engaging contribution to this conversation, Professor Joseph
10
Sanders says yes.
His conclusion rests on an examination of
empirical data (some published, some new and unpublished), and he
is cautious. Still, his conclusion is generally yes.
Professor Sanders builds on what he calls a “counterrevolutionary” Kansas decision and the work of Professor Alvin
11
Goldman.
Goldman suggests that we should consider (a) the
characteristics of the audience (juries), (b) the characteristics of the
witnesses (experts, including scientists), (c) the criterion to be
applied (Daubert or some other standard), and (d) other alternatives.
As for juries, we have indications that they have trouble with complex
cases, and with scientific evidence, and we have reason to believe that
better-educated juries do better in these areas. We have indications
that juries approach expertise with skepticism. We have indications
that juries appraise expert testimony not by grappling with technical
issues, but by counting extraneous factors like qualifications, the
number of arguments (rather than quality), and personal
attractiveness. We understand that jurors give more credence to
messages framed in simple language, less to those framed in complex
language, and they pay close attention to demeanor. As for experts,
we have confirmation of what we have long suspected: They tailor
their testimony to please whoever pays them. They learn to
“perform” in court. As for judges, we have some mixed news: Data on
state judges suggest that many do not understand the “testability”
concept (can the evidence be “falsified”?) or error rates, although
10

Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibiltiy of
Expert Evidence, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 881, 937-38 (2003); see also Brian Leiter, The
Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would not Make for Good
Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814-15 (1997) (referring to rules
designed to substitute “the rulemaker’s judgment abut what is epistemically best for
agents for their own judgment” as “epistemic paternalism”).
11
The Kansas decision is Kuhn v. Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1173-74 (Kan. 2000)
(refusing to apply the state’s Frye standard to testimony by treating physician, based
on differential diagnosis, that Parlodel caused a new mother to suffer stroke)
(Parlodel is a drug taken by mothers, who prefer not to breast feed their babies, in
order to suppress lactation). The court’s reasoning in Kuhn involves consideration
of factors similar to those advocated by Professor Goldman, except that the court
here decides that those factors support the conclusion that juries can appropriately
evaluate such testimony, so the judge need not play screening role. The main work
by Professor Goldman on which Professor Sanders draws is Alvin Goldman, Epistemic
Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society, 88 J. of Philosophy 113 (1991).
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they do better with criteria of peer review and general acceptance.
Surveys of federal opinions, however, suggest that judges are
achieving a better understanding of science. As for alternatives, we
have some indications that cross-examination does little to affect jury
appraisals of expert testimony.
Looking at this data, Professor Sanders concludes that they
provide “some support” for restricting admissibility by a standard
applied by judges. He comments as well that his own reading of the
cases indicates that courts are doing better than the survey of state
judges suggests. I agree, and I too can report that reading many
decisions leads me to believe that appellate judges are doing better in
appraising scientific proof than they did in the days of Frye.
At the risk of being simplistic, I think four additional factors
point toward the need for a validity standard in which trial judges
screen out questionable science. First, on balance judges are better
educated than juries and are selected with attention to merit and
skill. Second, judges have experience with adversarial presentations
and are likely to be better able to understand the substance of
testimony and its relationship to the issues. Both of these points
suggest that judges can do better than juries in separating what
should count from what should not. Third, the complexity of
scientific evidence suggests that the “relevancy” criterion that applies
to other evidence is not adequate to deal with science. Although I
cannot prove it, I suspect that the very fact that a court admits
evidence that is daunting or complex conveys to jurors an unspoken
message of invitation, suggesting that they can rely on it (even though
12
they need not). Finally, in jury-tried civil cases, it seems wiser to
have judges decide the validity point simply because it is better to
separate the decision on this point from the decision on the merits.
The point is not merely that “two heads are better than one”
(counting one head for the judge and one for the jury), but that one
can reasonably expect a better decision on validity by someone who is
not also responsible to decide whether the plaintiff or the defendant
13
has the stronger case.

12

That jurors’ expectations may affect the way they process the evidence they
hear is recognized in a different context in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,
188-89 (1997) (stating that juror expectations may arise “from the experience of a
trial itself,” and that shifting from descriptions by witnesses “naturally” describing “a
train of events” to a different kind of presentation may make jurors “wonder what
they are being kept from knowing”).
13
This point was raised during the Seton Hall Symposium, Expert Admissibility:
Keeping Gates, Goals and Promises, in February 2003, but none of the various
participants, whom I contacted, claims credit for it. I had not thought of it before.
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Finally, I think that juries are even less likely than judges to
conclude that credentialed witnesses with scientific expertise are
mistaken. The eye-opening article in this Symposium by criminal
defense lawyer James Shellow claims, on the basis of experience, that
jurors cannot understand or follow cross-examination aimed at
revealing “flaws in methodology,” and that effective cross requires
essentially peripheral tactics, such as attacks on character or a
demonstration that the expert’s opinion is contradicted by published
texts. The burden of the examples cited by Mr. Shellow is that the
cross-examiner should exploit any unwillingness of the witness to
acknowledge the authority of texts by casting that very fact as a
14
demonstration of mendacity.
This practitioner’s view supports
empirical evidence described by Professor Sanders indicating that
jurors do not effectively come to grips with scientific evidence.
II. DAUBERT DOES NOT THROW OUT TOO MUCH EVIDENCE
Daubert has been cast as one of the villains in toxic tort claims
15
that fail, but I doubt that this claim is correct, and doubt even more
that this claim shows that Daubert is in some serious sense misguided
or mistaken. To start with, it was not clear on the day Daubert was
decided whether the effect of the new doctrine was actually to raise
or to lower the bar with respect to science (and now all expert
testimony). Although a recent study concludes that Daubert subjects
evidence proffered as science to increased scrutiny, Daubert itself
threw out a ruling that excluded expert testimony, and some modern
state decisions continue to declare that Daubert favors admissibility
16
more than Frye.
14

James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. ___
(upcoming in Fall 2003).
15
See generally Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests:
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 318 (2001) (pointing out that Daubert led to exclusion
of epidemiological testimony, criticizing opinions requiring that such proof show a
doubling of relative risk, and suggesting that federal courts should look to state
requirements for proving causation); Lucinda Finley, Guarding the Gate to the
Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 375 (1999) (urging that courts should not
place the burden of scientific uncertainty on plaintiffs).
16
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (contrasting the
“liberal thrust” of the Rules and the “permissive backdrop” behind FRE 702 with the
“austere standard” of Frye); State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (W. Va. 2002)
(contrasting Frye with the “more liberal” Daubert standard and adopting the latter).
But of course Judge Kozinski again excluded the evidence proffered in Daubert, this
time applying the new standard. See United States v. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.
1995); see also Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes In the Standards for Admitting Expert
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A. Critical Look Approach
Properly understood, Daubert only asks courts to look critically at
evidence proffered as science (or expertise more generally), and to
determine whether it is valid and what it can prove. In modern
decisions Daubert does not automatically block efforts to prove
causation by expert testimony resting, for example, on such
17
18
techniques as animal studies or differential diagnosis. The former
brings questions of dosage or exposure and questions stemming from
differences between humans and animals. The latter involves
attempts by treating physicians to eliminate other causes until only
one explanation is left. Proof of this sort can survive scrutiny under
Daubert, although it may properly be excluded if it fails adequately to
fit the case, its factual basis is inadequate, or the methods or
laboratory protocols were not properly followed. The problems of
rational inference raised by such evidence virtually invite attempts to
prove cause by evidence that does not really do so, and one cannot
seriously argue that all such proof is a reliable indicator of cause.
There is room for difference of opinion in applying the Daubert
standard, and no doubt room for mistakes. But in areas of such
difficulty, why would anyone expect otherwise?
It is true that proof based on chemical structure analysis has had
tough sledding, but skepticism is justified by the fact that the
technique is not suited to this use, and serves better as a tool for
19
mapping out future research.
It is also true that cases applying
Evidence In Federal Civil Cases since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 251,
274 (2002) (commenting, inter alia, that standards for reliability “tightened in the
years after the Daubert decision”).
17
Compare Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reversing summary judgment for defendants, in so-called “slap suit,” because trial
judge erred in refusing to consider Asian animal studies in support of
manufacturer’s claim that diet supplement was safe; Daubert “recognized that animal
studies are not per se inadmissible and should be subjected to substantive analysis,
just like other scientific evidence”), and Curtis v M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661,
669-70 (5th Cir. 1999) (partially reversing judgment dismissing claims arising out of
exposure to benzene because testimony by plaintiff’s expert resting partly on animal
studies satisfied Daubert standard), with Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194,
1201 (11th Cir. 2002) (excluding testimony based on animal studies indicating that
bromocriptine demonstrated vasoconstrictive properties in dogs and other animals
because they did not suffice to indicate similar effects in humans).
18
See Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prod., 295 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that
testimony based on differential diagnosis can satisfy the Daubert standard).
19
See REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 203 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1994)
(stating that the Environmental Protection Agency uses structure activity
relationships [“SARs”] in predicting toxicity of new chemicals, but “[their] reliability
has a number of limitations”) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL]; see also DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
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Daubert evince a preference for proving cause by means of
20
epidemiological studies. The problem with too much enthusiasm
for epidemiological evidence is that it is often unavailable: Claimants
cannot come up with such proof because it is expensive and takes a
long time to develop. Even if such evidence constitutes “the gold
standard” in this setting, however, courts applying Daubert regularly
allow causation to be proved in other ways.
B. Daubert as Source of Bad Rules
Some commentators suggest that Dabuert is the cause of certain
“rules” that block recovery in toxic tort cases. One is the supposed
rule that epidemiological evidence is admissible only if it shows a
doubling of incremental risk. The problem is as follows: Suppose a
study of two groups of 500 people, one group exposed to agent X and
one not exposed. In the exposed group, we find that thirty-six suffer
ailment Y, but in the unexposed group only twenty people suffer
ailment Y. The usual standard of statistical significance, in which p =
.05, requires that we be able to say that pure chance would produce
the observed result only one time in twenty (p = .05 refers to that low
21
22
probability).
Under this standard, our result is significant.

TESTIMONY, Toxicology: The Use of Toxicology in the Safety Assessment of Chemicals, § 34-2.4
(2002) (stating that “SAR has the pitfall of the exquisite sensitivity of certain
biological processes to relatively minuscule changes in chemical structure”); David E.
Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2178 (1994) (stating that
“[c]hemical structure analysis is an example of a scientific technique that has valid
scientific uses but is not properly used to prove causal association, much less
individual causation”); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa.
Super Ct., 1997) (finding that epidemiological studies “are necessary to establish
causation,” and that chemical structure analysis and in vitro testing can only “confirm
the biological plausibility of a causal relationship” but “contribute nothing” on their
own).
20
Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002)
(considering “difficult question” whether evidence of causation “in the absence of
epidemiology” can satisfy Daubert; here the answer is no; anecdotal evidence in the
form of case reports, challenge/rechallenge data, chemical analogies, and animal
studies are insufficient to prove that Parlodel causes strokes).
21
The calculations underlying the examples in this paragraph, and the text
accompanying notes 68-71, infra, are the ones required in comparing the means of
independent samples where standard deviation is not known (two groups of 500
people, one exposed to agent X, the other not exposed). The examples assume that
prior research indicates a causal link between agent X and disease Y, which is
important because the analysis must assume either that (1) it is unknown whether
agent X might actually lessen the risk of disease Y or (2) it is known that agent X
might increase the risk of disease Y and there is no reason to think it lessens that risk.
In the latter situation, the analysis employs a one-tailed test, and more results survive
scrutiny. See RUSSELL T. HURLBURT, COMPREHENDING BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS, 238-74
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Scientists would take it seriously as an indication that agent X causes
23
Actually, it is now recommended that researchers
ailment Y.
reporting statistically significant findings include the “confidence
interval” with their report. The latter describes the range of outcomes
that would be expected to occur by pure chance no more than five
percent of the time. The narrower the interval, and the further up
from critical value that the interval lies, the higher the quality of the
24
reported result.
Still, if all we knew about the plaintiff was that he was exposed to
agent X and suffers ailment Y, even our statistically significant result
does not by itself indicate that agent X probably caused plaintiff’s
ailment. We could say otherwise, however, if the result showed more
than a doubling of incremental risk—let us say that 42 people in the
exposed group suffer ailment Y, and only twenty people in the

(3d ed. 2003) (providing an account of the underlying calculations). Following
Professor Neil Cohen’s suggestion to use confidence intervals, rather than mere
point estimates, the calculations in this article present both. See generally Neil Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985). For a critique of this approach, see D.H. Kaye, Apples and
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 54
(1987). For a reply, see Neil Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities:
A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987).
22
In this example (36 exposed people suffer ailment Y, and 20 unexposed
people), the result is statistically significant at p = .05. For this level of significance,
the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the
comparison of the two samples, is 2.13, which falls in the critical range. The
confidence interval for the comparison is .007-.057. The null hypothesis is that
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people. The null hypothesis
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval
will span the number 0 or fall below it. Since the observed point value of t exceeds
the critical value of t, and since the confidence interval spans a range above 0, the
result is statistically significant.
23
I recognize that this standard has itself become controversial if taken as a
minimum requirement for evidence offered in civil cases, and I return to this subject
in Part III. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
24
The reason a narrow confidence interval is better is that it indicates greater
precision in the test. If results would be expected to exceed or fall below 14-15 only
5% of the time, the test is more precise than one in which the results would be
expected to exceed or fall below 10-20 only 5% of the time. See HURLBURT, supra
note 21, at 263 (noting with approval that journal editors “often require authors to
report confidence intervals”). In the case of comparative risk, an interval spanning 1
(point of no correlation between exposure and ailment) would not be significant.
See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 19, at 173 (explaining that with p value of .05, “a
confidence interval would indicate the range of relative risk values that would result
95% of the time if the study were repeated,” so, the width of the confidence interval
indicates “the precision of the point estimate of relative risk,” and narrower
confidence intervals thus indicate more confidence in the resulting estimate;
however, where interval spans critical value, a relative risk of 1.0, the results are not
significant).
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unexposed group. In this case, combing the epidemiological study
with our knowledge of the plaintiff would suggest that agent X
probably did cause his ailment. The reason is that more than half the
observed instances of ailment Y in the exposed population were
caused by agent X, so any one person in the group is more likely than
not to have become ill from exposure to agent X. The result of this
test, by the way, would once again satisfy the conventional notion of
25
statistical significance.
In fact, however, the situation is seldom so simple. The
probative force of such proof turns on such things as levels of
exposure (time and dose), adequate sampling techniques, specificity
of symptoms measured, and controlling for extrinsic (or potentially
26
confounding) variables. Moreover, taking seriously the conventions
of statistical significance described above, even outcomes showing
more than a doubling of incremental risk would not necessarily
27
persuade scientists to draw any conclusions. Also, a relative risk in
the neighborhood of two is not as high as it sounds (scientists often
28
see far higher relative risks).
25

In this example (42 exposed people suffer ailment Y and 20 unexposed
people), the result is statistically significant at p = .05. For this level of significance,
the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the
comparison of the two samples, is 2.93, which falls in the critical range. The
confidence interval for the comparison is .019-.069. Again the null hypothesis is that
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people. The null hypothesis
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval
would span the number 0, or fall below it. Since the observed point value of t
exceeds the critical value of t and since the confidence interval spans a range above
0, the result is statistically significant.
26
See generally LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 192-95, 204-17 (2d ed. 2000)
(describing guidelines for studies of problems in causation, which require
researchers to consider: (1) temporal relationship; (2) strength of association; (3)
dose-response relationship; (4) replication of findings; (5) biologic plausibility; (6)
consideration of alternative explanations; (7) cessation of exposure; (8) specificity of
association; and (9) consistency with other knowledge). Other problems in
epidemiological studies include: (a) selection bias; (b) information bias; (c)
confounding factors; and (d) interaction. Id.; see also Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., No. 96-689-Civ-Orl-19B, 1998 WL 812318, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998). This
case describes the Bradford-Hill criteria for appraising epidemiological proof of
causation, which include:
(1) the strength of the association or how far above 1.0 is the relative
risk; (2) the consistency of the association or its reproducibility; (3) the
specificity of the signs and symptoms or whether they are unusual and
distinctive; (4) the dose response; (5) the temporality; and (6) the
biologic plausibility of the theory of causation.
Id.
27
See infra example 4, note 71 and accompanying text.
28
See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1212 (10th Cir.
2002) (noting study results that indicate that the relative risk of stroke in post-partum
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Putting aside these problems, commentators are right that
epidemiological studies should be admissible to show general
causation even if relative risk is less than two, and a few decisions do
29
miss this point. When the purpose is to prove specific cause, it
makes sense to insist on relative risk exceeding two because such
proof is mathematically sufficient to satisfy the preponderance
standard. But even this restriction assumes that there is no other
evidence of exposure: If there is other evidence, then even
epidemiological proof that does not show a doubling of risk is still
relevant as partial proof of specific cause. Many modern decisions
(state and federal) approve epidemiological evidence showing a
30
relative risk less than two,
and many demonstrate good
31
understanding of this idea. Decisions refusing to accept the proof
when it shows a relative risk less than two often do so for other
32
reasons, and not on the basis of simple misunderstanding.
women is 28.3, as compared with non-pregnant women); Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 336 (E.D. N.Y. 2000) (noting in cigarette smoking case that risks
of lung cancer are 5 times higher for asbestos workers than for other workers, 50
times higher if asbestos workers smoke cigarettes, and 87 times higher if asbestos
workers smoke more than a pack a day); In re Joint Eastern and S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (reporting relative risk of lung cancer
in cigarette smokers as compared to nonsmokers is “on the order of 10:1”).
29
Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that plaintiff’s proof is not founded on epidemiological evidence
showing relative risk greater than 2.0, “or some other evidence” of causation, so the
evidence does not have “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry” under
Daubert and stating that a relative risk of less than 2.0 “may suggest teratogenicity, but
actually tends to disprove legal causation”).
30
Among federal cases, see In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d
1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), which held that the trial court erred in requiring that
epidemiological evidence show a relative risk greater than 2.0 and further stated that,
to show “generic causation,” plaintiffs only needed scientific evidence that radiation
“was capable of causing” injuries such as those suffered by plaintiff. Among state
cases, see McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997),
which adopted the Daubert standard, and also rejected the defense claim that
epidemiological evidence is admissible only if it shows relative risk exceeding 2.0.
31
See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 712 n.166 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting passage
from REFERENCE MANUAL); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding a relative risk exceeding 2.0 permits “an inference that the
plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not caused by the agent,” yet noting that no
one doubts that smoking can cause heart disease even though relative risk in that
setting is only 1.5); In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1028
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an epidemiologist might find cause where relative risk
is less than 2.0, but a “more likely than not” test “is not satisfied by epidemiological
evidence alone” unless relative risk exceeds 2.0).
32
See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1315 (approving exclusion of evidence showing relative
risk of 1.24 because “it was so significantly close to 1.0 that the court thought the
study was not worth serious consideration for proving causation” in a breast implant
case).
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Another supposed rule holds that evidence of differential
diagnosis cannot be admitted to show that agent X caused plaintiff to
suffer ailment Y unless there is additional proof of general cause—
whether epidemiological or based on animal studies—that agent X
does cause ailment Y in some people. Such proof is popular because
it is less expensive, and it can be provided by treating physicians who
are not toxicologists or epidemiologists. Essentially the physician
testifies that she tried to account for the ailment in other ways,
through testing or treatment regimens, and thus eliminated all other
possible or likely causes except agent X. Here the cases conflict.
Some hold that differential diagnosis can only eliminate other causes,
and because the technique is necessarily uncertain (it is hard to know
when one has eliminated all but one cause), it can only supplement
33
affirmative proof that agent X sometimes causes such ailments.
Other cases admit such proof without such preconditions, accepting
34
it as relevant to show causation. There is no settled rule, and courts
seem to be trying hard to distinguish between testimony that does
35
eliminate other plausible risks, and testimony that does not.
In
other words, the decisions seem to draw sensible qualitative
distinctions that connect with the task that Daubert asks courts to
36
perform.
33

See e.g., Rider, 295 F.3d at 1194, 1199 (affirming summary judgment for
defendant in a Parlodel suit after a Daubert hearing because the proffered evidence
of causation was not sufficient to prove causation; also finding that case reports based
on differential diagnosis could not by themselves prove causal link “because they
report symptoms observed in a single patient in an uncontrolled context,” which can
“rule out other potential causes” but cannot rule out the possibility that the observed
effect “is simply idiosyncratic or the result of unknown confounding factors,” so such
reports “may support other proof of causation,” but “ordinarily cannot prove
causation” by themselves); Hollander, 289 F.3d at 1210-11; Glastetter v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2001) (containing an analysis similar to
Rider).
34
Mattis v. Carlton Elec. Prods. 295 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2002) (admitting
differential diagnosis testimony in electrician’s suit against a maker of PVCs as
sufficient to prove causation, where a physician “ruled out other possible causes,”
including “smoking, asthma, or ammonia,” and concluded that plaintiff developed
reactive airways syndrome “as a result of his exposure to Carlon cement fumes”).
35
See Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibilty of Differential Diagnosis
Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive
Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 137 (2001) (stating that Daubert has led to
“greater skepticism” about differential diagnosis testimony, but that courts have
reached a “fair degree of consensus” on questions such as whether the proponent
must first offer “ruling-in” evidence before offering “ruling-out” testimony and on
the sufficiency of proof resting largely on “temporal order”).
36
Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating
that differential diagnosis “normally should not be excluded because the expert has
failed to rule out every possible alternative cause,” but that testimony may be
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Of course both of these “rules” could be deployed unwisely to
block just claims. It might even be true that a Daubert regime
provides greater opportunity for courts to make such mistakes than
Frye did. Certainly the most liberal “Rule 702” standard in current
use, in which courts look at credentials and apply the “helpfulness”
standard, would less often lead to exclusion of such evidence. But
such proof should be excluded when it is thin, and looking directly at
the science seems a good thing, not a bad thing.
These supposed “rules” also invite the criticism that courts are
applying Daubert to measure the sufficiency of scientific evidence,
37
rather than its relevancy. Some opinions appear to collapse notions
of relevancy and sufficiency. That is not the fault of Daubert, however,
and other modern decisions clearly understand the difference
38
between relevance and sufficiency in this setting. In partial answer
to this criticism, it is worth noting that a court asked to rule on an
offer of proof sometimes should exclude the evidence because it is
insufficient. In other contexts, it is perfectly conventional for courts
to sustain objections on the ground that evidence does not suffice to
39
prove the point for which it is offered. There is absolutely nothing
wrong with doing so, at least in cases in which the proponent has no
additional evidence on the point in question and has had an
adequate opportunity to advise the court about the proof that he
does have and to make the usual proffer.

excluded where it fails to consider other potential causes). The court in Cooper
found that the record was “replete with evidence that smoking can cause non-unions
to occur,” and that plaintiff was a pack-a-day smoker for 25 years, a fact that expert
“categorically dismissed.”
37
See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Daubert Revisited: Disturbing Implications, 22
CHAMPION 18 (May 1998) (criticizing federal courts that have invoked the “fit” or
“relevancy” prong of Daubert to insist that epidemiological proof satisfy what amounts
to a sufficiency standard).
38
See Joint Dist. Asbestos Liab. Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that “Daubert did not alter the traditional sufficiency standard” and reversing
the trial court’s judgment for defendant as matter of law because the trial court
“erred in ruling that plaintiff presented insufficient epidemiological and clinical
evidence” to prove causation).
39
See, e.g., Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir.
2001); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 296 (3d
Cir. 1963), aff’d, 378 U.S. 123 (both rejecting offers of proof because the evidence
could not prove the point for which it was offered unless other evidence was offered,
which offeror did not include or could not obtain).
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C. Daubert and Erie
Professor Margaret Berger offers another criticism of what she
40
takes to be the judge-made doubling rule. Imposing this rule in
federal diversity suits, she argues, violates the Erie doctrine. Stated in
its strongest terms, the argument is that this judge-made rule, created
in a Daubert-inspired construction of FRE 702, is substantive and is
intended to affect outcome in a particular class of cases. Drawing on
a modern opinion by Judge Posner in the Healy case, Professor
Berger suggests that federal courts must apply any state substantive
rule that is “in actual conflict” with a Federal Rule, and any “state
41
procedural rule” that applies to “a particular substantive area.” Lest
anyone think the decision in Hanna stands in the way because it puts
the Federal Rules beyond Erie-based challenge, Professor Berger
reminds us that a prominent modern decision requires federal courts
42
to apply state substantive law even when a Federal Rule is in play.
She concludes that when a state court interprets evidence law “so as
43
to better a plaintiff’s odds of prevailing in toxic tort litigation,” the
result is a state rule applying in a particular class of cases, so federal
courts must observe it. Perhaps more importantly, the state rule is
substantive because it creates an incentive for manufacturers “to take
44
more care in testing their products.”
This is a brave and inventive argument. There is something to
be said for the proposition that if the state and federal systems
persistently produce different outcomes in similar cases, on account
of what seems to be different standards of proof, while purporting to
apply the same substantive principles, the result would be
troublesome. I concur in Professor Berger’s argument that federal
courts should consider state precedents on matters closely related to
sufficiency standards, and on evidential conventions that seem closely
40

See generally Berger, supra note 15.
See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 309 (7th
Cir. 1995), cited twice with approval in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S.
415, 428 n.7, 429 (1996). Erie refers to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
42
The reference in this text is to Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The
modern decision is Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996) (holding
that, in diversity suits, federal courts must apply state statute controlling
compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy; noting, however, that the
statute directs appellate courts to exercise this power, while in the federal system,
the trial judge must take this responsibility).
43
Berger, supra note 15, at 319.
44
The indicated conclusion is that a contrary judge-made federal rule violates
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2003), or the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2003) in its modern formulation. Berger, supra note 15, at 312-19.
41
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related to substantive principles. Federal courts often do just that,
but most of the time they do not view themselves as bound by state
law, and it seems telling that Judge Posner himself goes to great
lengths to avoid being bound by state rules relating to proof in tort
46
cases.
In the end, the Erie argument seems misconceived. To begin
with, federal decisions don’t impose a “doubling rule” for
epidemiological evidence (instead they analyze and assess probative
worth and sufficiency). More importantly, different results on this
question seem epistemological, rather than policy-driven. What I
mean by epistemological is that the differences look like variations in
attempts by federal and state judges to implement the “sufficient
evidence” standard by deciding “how much evidence is enough” to
allow a reasonable juror to find that cause has been proved under the
preponderance standard. If the results were policy-driven, one would
expect to see opinions linking the discussion of “how much is
enough” to particular substantive standards, or to the purposes of tort
law as compensatory and loss-spreading or as shifting to
manufacturers only actual costs of injury while keeping innovation
alive and costs down. One would also expect policy-based decisions
to generate bright-line rules, or even statutes governing recurrent
situations.
Of course judges might mask their decisions, justifying them

45

See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting in a breast implant case that Erie requires application of state substantive
standards and commenting, with reference to evidence of relative risk, that state law
requires proof based on “reasonable medical probability,” interpreted to mean “the
functional equivalent of preponderance of the evidence”); In re Simon II Litig., 211
F.R.D. 86, 157 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) (commenting that allowing “statistical proof” of
causation in cigarette smoking litigation does not conflict with Erie because there is
“no ruling New York case which holds that state substantive law will not permit the
use of modern aggregation forensic tools to support a massive fraud action”).
46
See S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 309-10. Judge Posner, writing the opinion in
Healy, cites two tort cases in which the Erie issue is “pretty easy” because the state rule
is “limited to a particular substantive area.” Id. Judge Posner authored both prior
opinions, and both times he avoided applying the state rule. See also Barron v. Ford
Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd., 965 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state statute
blocking proof that claimant was not wearing seatbelt was substantive, but that it did
not apply where defendant claimed that seatbelts were a design element relevant to
the question whether it was reasonable to make sunroof out of laminated glass);
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply
a state rule letting plaintiff prove design change, because a federal rule blocks it;
noting that the matter is both substantive and procedural, but that it would be
“melodramatic” to label federal rule as substantive and require federal courts to
apply state counterpart) (at the time, state and federal rule were textually identical,
but state and federal courts diverged on question whether rule excludes such proof).
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epistemologically rather than by reference to substantive policy.
Indeed, humanly speaking it is hard to imagine deciding whether
indirect proof of cause suffices unless one also thinks about
substantive policies, and what is humanly at stake—a serious injury or
ailment on one side, the future of a drug on the other. But if every
judicial attempt to think epistemologically (hence procedurally) is
viewed as a masked effort to implement policy choices, then the Erie
doctrine is doomed. We would be forced to the conclusion that
federal courts cannot at the same time operate as “an independent
system for administering justice” as contemplated by Justice Brennan
47
in Byrd while complying with Erie’s command to honor state
substantive policy choices. Professor Berger does not make such an
extravagant claim, but her contention that federal judges are
sometimes implementing substantive policy choices comes close to
48
that, since the opinions do not say that they are behaving in this way.
In any event, the federal decisions that have noticed this issue
have mostly avoided concluding that Erie mandates following state
49
practice on this point. On the root question whether a state or
federal standard governs the sufficiency question in diversity
litigation, there is stronger support for the proposition that federal
50
law governs than there is for applying a state standard.
47

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
See Berger, supra note 15, at 301-06 (noting that in federal decisions “insisting
on epidemiological proof” or those insisting that a plaintiff’s epidemiological
evidence show a relative risk exceeding 2.0, judges “are not making value-free
determinations that are the inevitable consequences of a system of rational proof”).
49
See Bartley v. Euclid, Inc., 158 F.3d 261, 272-73 & n9 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
that if state law requires the evidence to show more than doubled risk in the exposed
population, the proof satisfied the standard; if this requirement defines burden of
proof, it is arguably “procedural rather than substantive, and therefore controlled by
federal rather than state law”) (dissent argues that state rule is substantive); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 259
(rejecting defense claim, in smoking case, that Erie required federal courts to require
“proof of individual injury,” and commenting that the question is “better posed as a
question of legal sufficiency”; if mixture of statistical and individualized evidence can
prove cause, then “no Erie question is presented by federal evidentiary procedures
which allow for the use of aggregate proof”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F
.Supp. 1387, 1394-95(D. Or. 1996) (rejecting a claim that Erie required the federal
court to apply state rule relating to proof of causation in breast implant suit). But see
Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 942, 948 n.4
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (stating that if the application of a “federal evidentiary rule” leads
to dismissal, whereas the application of the state rule would not, “then, under Erie,
the evidentiary ruling might be considered substantive rather than procedural”);
Raynor v. Merrell Pharm., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a
“question of sufficiency would be a substantive rule under Erie”).
50
See generally 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2525 (2d ed. 1995) (opining that many courts now agree that
48
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D. The 2000 Amendments
The amendments to FRE 702 adopted in 2000 reinforce
Daubert’s message that courts are to take a close and independent
look at evidence proffered as science, and increase the difficulties of
arguing under Erie that rulings on sufficiency are substantive. In
effect, these amendments say that everything that could affect validity
and accuracy count. Not only should courts insure that scientific
testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods,” which
was the actual holding of Daubert, and not only should courts insure
that scientific evidence rests on “sufficient facts or data,” which was
part of the sufficiency calculus that courts perform under FRCP 50
and sometimes in connection with rulings on offers of proof under
FRE 103, but courts should also take steps to ensure that the witness
51
“has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts.”
The latter provision resolves a conflict among the cases in favor
of more judicial scrutiny. This language directs trial judges to
consider issues of laboratory protocol in determining whether to
admit or exclude expert testimony, meaning that these issues affect
not merely weight, but admissibility. Some pre-amendment authority
had pointed toward this conclusion, but other decisions pointed
52
toward the opposite conclusion. Whether the 2000 amendments
“principle seems to require that the federal court apply the federal test”)(internal
citation omitted); Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (11th
Cir. 1983) (stating that it is settled under Erie that “federal law controls questions of
the sufficiency of the evidence in state law claims”); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d
365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that “in diversity cases federal courts apply a
federal rather than a state test for the sufficiency of evidence to create a jury
question”) (en banc). Contra Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 511 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that state law determines sufficiency).
51
FED. R. EVID. 702. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000
amendments to FRE 702 states that it is “important” that the “application” of
principles and methods “be conducted reliably,” and cites an opinion by Judge
Becker. As the author of the opinion in Downing, which anticipated Daubert and was
cited there with approval, Judge Becker has been unusually active and innovative in
dealing constructively with problems of scientific evidence. See United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). Elsewhere Judge Becker endorsed the
proposition that judges should assess not only validity and accuracy of principles, but
issues of application. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir.
1994) (finding that “any step” making expert testimony “unreliable” also makes it
inadmissible, regardless whether it “completely changes a reliable methodology or
merely misapplies” it).
52
Compare United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that under Daubert the court should require expert to show that he “properly
performed the protocols involved in DNA profiling”), with Unites States v. Chischilly,
30 F.3d 1144, 1154 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that questions relating to conduct of
laboratory procedures go to weight, not admissibility), and United States v. Shea, 211
F.3d 658, 668 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that flaws in application of methodology go to
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will have real impact on the way courts deal with scientific evidence
has yet to be seen. These changes have not yet been widely adopted
by the states, perhaps because they have not had enough time to
53
consider the matter.
III. DAUBERT PROPERLY CONCEIVES SCIENCE, AND TAKES THE RIGHT
LEGAL STANCE TOWARD SCIENCE
Critics complain that Daubert is incoherent, perhaps even
internally conflicted, in two critical respects—in its view of science,
and in its conception of the proper relationship between science and
54
law. There is power in these observations, but I mean to say once
again that Daubert is not at fault. Indeed, one of the strengths of the
opinion is that its vision is broad enough to embrace internal
tensions and difficulties in science, and in the relationship between
law and science, that cannot be avoided. For us in the scholarly
community, and for judges toiling in the vineyards, the “task at
55
hand” is to make our way toward appropriate accommodations of
weight, not admissibility); also compare People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding that pretrial hearing should determine whether “the
experiments and calculations performed by the testing laboratory in the particular
case yielded results sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury,” and factual issues
relating to “the reliability of any particular test” can affect weight, but can also show
that the evidence is “inadmissible as a matter of law”), with Fishback v. People, 851
P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993) (matters of “implementation and execution” go to
weight, not admissibility) (applying Frye standard). See also People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d
68, 73-9 (Colo. 2001) (discarding Frye and adopting standard similar to Daubert;
noting that some courts consider that matters of implementation of methods affect
admissibility, but not taking a position on this issue); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The
Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19
(1991) (matters of laboratory protocol should affect admissibility, not just weight).
53
I am aware of one state that has apparently adopted the new language. See
MISS. R. EVID. 702 (adopting the new federal language). In Colorado, the state
Supreme Court rejected a recommendation by its Evidence Rules Advisory
Committee to adopt the federal language, after I argued unsuccessfully in favor of its
adoption. The expressed concern was that adopting language that seemed so closely
related to Daubert would essentially adopt Daubert itself, a questionable position given
that Colorado had just rejected the Frye standard, in order to adopt its own standard,
which is similar to, but not identical with, Daubert. See Shreck, 22 P.3d at 73-79
(requiring trial courts to consider reliability of expert testimony, qualifications of
witness, and usefulness of testimony, thus endorsing the Daubert factors without
adopting Daubert).
54
See Jan Beyea and Daniel Berger, Scientific Misconceptions Among Daubert
Gatekeepers: The Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
327 (2001); see also Margaret Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Epistemology and Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183 (1994).
55
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (characterizing the responsibility of trial judge to
include ensuring that an expert’s testimony “rests on a reliable foundation and is

2003

DAUBERT ASKS THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

1007

these difficulties.
Let us consider first the charge that Daubert’s view of science is
incoherent. On the one hand, we can see in the core of the opinion
(the part that adopts the validity standard and speaks of accuracy and
propositions that can be tested or “falsified”) an apparent belief that
science is a static body of objective knowledge reflecting certainty.
On the other hand, we also find in Daubert suggestions that (a)
science is a process, hence anything but static; (b) scientific
knowledge does not reflect certainty, but is uncertain and contingent;
and (c) scientific expertise is affected by the forces that generate
56
litigation, hence subjective in some respects, and socially constructed.
This incoherent view, it is said, makes the task that Daubert sets for
judges impossible to perform: In effect, Daubert charges them to apply
static objective standards in appraising shifting subjective, contingent
knowledge.
Let us consider the relationship between law and science, as
Daubert envisions it. On the one hand, Daubert affirms that it is the
job of courts to appraise science, and courts are not simply to defer to
the scientific community on the question whether evidence
presented as science is valid and reliable. This role for courts is what
we mean by “gatekeeping.” On the other hand, Daubert says courts
are to judge science by the standards that scientists deploy in judging
science. Kumho Tire adds an exclamation point in commenting that
scientists are to bring to the courtroom “the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
57
field.” Again this incoherent view asks courts to do what they cannot
do and fails to recognize that science and law have different agendas,
goals and purposes, and operate under different constraints.
A. A Defective View of Science?
On the question whether Daubert has a defective view of science,
I would begin by suggesting that the problem of objectivity has a
familiar ring, perhaps because bridging the gap between human
perceptions and the world has engaged philosophers for thousands
of years, and the conversation is not over yet. How surprising is it to

relevant to the task at hand”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining how
judges apply Daubert factors “to the case at hand”).
56
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 596 (noting that “arguably, there are no certainties in
science,” and commenting that science is “a process for proposing and refining
theoretical explanations about the world,” making it qualitatively different from the
law).
57
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
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find that philosophers and historians of science report that science
too is not the wholly objective edifice that we outsiders envision?
Thomas Kuhn’s salient work argues that the choice between what he
called “competing paradigms” in science “cannot be determined
merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal
58
science.” The philosopher of science Karl Popper, of whom we have
heard because Daubert draws on his work, takes a similar position. In
defending the proposition that science is distinguished from other
forms of knowledge by the fact that it can be “falsified,” he argued
that a proposition can be falsified only by a “basic statement,”
meaning a singular empirical statement that is accepted because it
59
has been tested “inter-subjectively” rather than objectively.
Yet views as skeptical as these cannot long survive unchallenged
in a world that has seen such extraordinary accomplishments as laser
surgery, the internet, space stations and jet airline travel. Obviously
science has answers to critical questions, and Kuhn and Popper both
recognized as much. What Kuhn called “normal science” proceeds,
he wrote, out of random early “fact-gathering” toward something
resembling “an accepted model or pattern” that he called a
“paradigm,” which succeeds because it is more successful than other
paradigms “in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners
has come to recognize as acute.” “Mopping-up” operations that are
“what engage most scientists throughout their careers,” and these
proceed after the adoption of a paradigm, and constitute “normal
60
science.” In the end, what counts most as a critical criterion of
61
scientific paradigms is predictive accuracy. Popper was less direct in
suggesting a positive account of scientific knowledge, but he did
comment that scientists reach a kind of stopping point with
“statements about whose acceptance or rejection the various
investigators are likely to reach agreement,” and he acknowledged
that we must find such stopping points or end in a new “Babel of
58

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94 (3d ed. 1996).
KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY §§ 8, 22, 28, 29 (Routledge
Classics 2002) (stating that a theory can be “falsified” only by means of “a reproducible
effect which refutes the theory”).
60
KUHN, supra note 58, at 15, 23, 25-27 (these “mopping-up” operations involve
investigating those facts that “the paradigm has shown to be particularly revealing of
the nature of things,” as well as facts that lack “intrinsic interest” but “can be
compared directly with predictions” from the paradigm).
61
THOMAS S. KUHN, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice, in INTRODUCTORY
READINGS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 436 (Klemke et al. eds., 3d ed. 1998)(listing
“as characteristics of a good scientific theory” the following factors: accuracy,
consistency, breadth of scope, and fruitfulness in the sense of encouraging new
phenomena or previously unnoticed relationships).
59
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Tongues” in which scientific discovery “would be reduced to
absurdity,” and “the soaring edifice of science would soon lie in
62
ruins.”
Perhaps Daubert should be faulted for being too skeptical of
science. As Professor Ron Allen argues, it seems odd to posit as a
standard of scientific validity the question whether a proposition can
be “falsified” as opposed to “verified” or “confirmed.” Arguably such
a standard is too demanding if we wind up accepting scientific
63
knowledge only if it has been tested in every conceivable way, and
Thomas Kuhn took issue with the very idea of “falsification” in an
64
account that stresses more positive notions of verification. But I do
not believe Daubert meant to erect a barrier as high as that. It may be
comforting to consider that Popper, in explaining why he chose
“falsifiability” as the central criterion of science, says his purpose was
to distinguish science from myth and metaphysics. Specifically he
had in mind the claims of Carl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Alfred
Adler, which he viewed as “pseudo-science” more closely resembling
65
astrology than astronomy.
Popper did not actually argue that
nothing could be accepted until it was tested so exhaustively that
nobody could doubt it.
Rather, he argued that a scientific

62

POPPER, supra note 59, § 29 (characterizing this situation as “a failure of
language as a means of universal communication”).
63
See Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1169-71 (1994) (arguing that Daubert “adopted uncritically the
view that Popperian falsifiability is at the heart of modern science,” showing “no
awareness” that that view is controversial and inadequate because it suggests that
science produces knowledge only if it survives “all conceivable tests,” but fails to
account for the accomplishments of scientists, who “do not believe that all they know
are negatives,” and know “a lot of positive truths” too). For a reply to this criticism,
see Sean O’Connor, The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl Popper
Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 263 (1995).
64
KUHN, supra note 58, at 145-47 (describing “probabilistic verification theories”
that “compare the given scientific theory with all others that might be imagined to
fit” the data, or construct by imagination “all the tests that the given scientific theory
‘might conceivably be asked to pass,’ and doubting that any test can falsify any theory
because “no theory ever solves all the puzzles,” and indeed “it is just the
incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any time,
define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science”).
65
Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 38-40 (Klemke et al. eds.) (describing a conversation
with Adler in which the author had mentioned a child, whom Adler had “no
difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had
not even seen the child,” because, as Adler said, he had “thousandfold experience,”
leading the author to conclude that that Adler’s “previous observations may not have
been much sounder than this new one,” proving only that any case “could be
interpreted in light of the theory”).
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proposition is one that can be tested. And of course the Popper
account tracks a salient feature of the scientific method, which is to
test a hypothesis to see whether experimental results refute it (testing
the “null hypothesis” in common parlance).
In sum, what we might take as incoherence or internal conflict
in Daubert’s view of science can also be understood more
constructively as a kind of dualism that embodies a view of science
similar to what we find in Kuhn and Popper. Rather than
abandoning any search for a validity standard, this dualistic view
should lead us to recognize, in words that Professor Nance might find
67
congenial, that reliability is not an all-or-nothing concept, but a
relative concept: Often it will be possible to insist on a kind of
“certainty” of the sort that we have in mind when we speak of the
tides or the hour of sunrise, but other times we can only expect the
sort of “certainty” that we have when we say that asbestos causes some
kinds of lung cancer.
B. Misconceived Relationship between Law and Science?
A serious criticism of Daubert is that courts are being led to
demand a higher level of statistical significance than is appropriate.
Epidemiological evidence might support the conclusion that
exposure to agent X increases the risk of ailment Y, thus in turn
supporting an inference of general causation (agent X causes some
instances of ailment Y).
Alternatively, it might support the
conclusion that exposure more than doubles the risk, thus in turn
supporting an inference of general causation and perhaps even
specific causation (plaintiff was exposed and is ailing, and so agent X
is the cause).
To illustrate these points, consider some examples comparing
500-person samples (one group exposed to agent X, one not
exposed). Example 1 (risk increase): We find that thirty-six exposed
people have ailment Y, but only twenty unexposed people. These
numbers suggest that ailment Y suffered by sixteen out of thirty-six

66

LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, supra note 59, § 22 (we must “clearly
distinguish between falsifiability and falsification”); see also Conjectures and Refutations,
supra note 65, at 43 (task is not to identify “meaningfulness or significance” or
“truth” or “acceptability,” but rather to distinguish statements and systems belonging
to “the empirical sciences” from all others, whether “psychoanalytic” or “myth” or
something else; the latter are not “unimportant, or insignificant,” and “may contain
important anticipations of scientific theories”; indeed, psychoanalytic theories
“contain most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form”).
67
See Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. __ (upcoming in Fall 2003).
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exposed people came from agent X, that relative risk is 1.8, and that
there is a .444 probability that agent X caused any given case of
68
ailment Y in the exposed population. Example 2 (risk increase): In
the exposed group, twenty-nine people have ailment Y; again only
twenty in the unexposed group. These numbers suggest that ailment
Y suffered by nine out of twenty-nine exposed people came from
agent X, that relative risk is 1.45, and that there is a .310 probability
that agent X caused any given case of ailment Y in the exposed
69
population. Example 3 (risk more than doubled): We find that
forty-two exposed people have ailment Y, but only twenty unexposed
people have it. These numbers suggest that the ailments suffered by
twenty-two out of forty-two exposed people came from agent X, that
relative risk is 2.1, and that there is a .542 probability that agent X
70
caused any given case of ailment Y in the exposed population.
Example 4 (risk more than doubled): We find that five exposed
people have ailment Y, and only two unexposed people. These
numbers suggest that the ailments suffered by five out of seven
exposed people came from agent X, that relative risk is 3.5, and that
there is a probability of .714 that agent X caused any given case of
71
ailment Y in the exposed population.
68

In this example (36 exposed and 20 unexposed people suffer the ailment)
recall from note 22 that the result is statistically significant at p = .05. The observed
value of t exceeds the critical value of t, and the confidence interval for the
comparison is .007 to.057, which lies above the value of 0 that the null hypothesis
would assume.
69
In this example (29 exposed and 20 unexposed people suffer the ailment) the
result is not statistically significant at p = .05. For this level of significance, the critical
point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in the comparison of the
two samples is 1.28, which falls below the critical range. The confidence interval for
the comparison of the two samples is -.005-.041. Again the null hypothesis is that
exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people. The null hypothesis
assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the confidence interval
will span the number 0. Since the observed point value of t is less than 1.65, and
since the confidence interval does span 0, the result is not statistically significant (we
do not reject the null hypothesis).
70
In this example (42 exposed people suffer the ailment, and 20 unexposed
people), recall from note 25 that the result is statistically significant at p = .05. The
observed value of t exceeds the critical value of t, and the confidence interval for the
comparison is .019-.069, which lies above the value of 0 that the null hypothesis
would assume.
71
In this example (5 exposed people suffer the ailment, and 2 unexposed
people), the result is not statistically significant at p = .05. For this level of
significance, the critical point value of t is 1.65, and the observed point value of t, in
the comparison of the two samples, is 1.2, which falls below the critical range. The
confidence interval for the comparison of the two samples is -.002-.014. Again the
null hypothesis is that exposure has no bearing on the number of ailing people. The
null hypothesis assumes an observed value of t below 1.65, and assumes that the
confidence interval will span the number 0. Since the observed point value of t is less
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The usual approach to the question whether agent X causes
ailment Y is to begin with the “null hypothesis” that there is no
correlation. If that were so, then in the two samples (500 exposed
people; 500 unexposed people) the number of observed instances of
ailment Y would be the same. But the outcome of studies may
suggest, as do Examples 1-4 above, that the null hypothesis should be
rejected, and that agent X does indeed cause ailment Y. Let us begin
by understanding the meaning of these outcomes. To start with, the
suggested conclusions are all general and qualified, and each can be
deployed to state a probability, but not a certainty. The conclusions
are all general because they suggest that agent X is a causal factor in
the mass of observed instances of ailment Y. The conclusions are
qualified because they suggest that agent X causes certain
percentages of observed instances of ailment Y in exposed
populations. The conclusions can be deployed to state probabilities
because they suggest that, among ailing and exposed people, there
are certain probabilities, equal to the percentages suggested by the
figures, that any given instance of ailment Y was caused by agent X.
In the description set forth above, Examples 1 and 2 indicate
that exposure raises the risk but does not double it, thus supporting
inferences of general cause. Examples 3 and 4 indicate that exposure
more than doubles the risk, thus supporting inferences of both
general and specific cause. Epidemiologists would likely accept the
conclusions indicated by Examples 1 and 3, because they are
statistically significant at the level of p = .05, meaning that there is but
one chance in twenty that the numbers would appear by chance—by
random and inevitable differences in 500-person samples taken from
the general population. Epidemiologists would likely reject the
conclusions indicated by Examples 2 and 4 because they are not
statistically significant at this level. The effect of this convention is to
discourage “false positives” in favor of “false negatives,” or (as it is
sometimes said) to discourage α-errors by incurring more β-errors, or
discourage Type I errors in favor of more Type II errors. In other
words, the conventional standard is less tolerant of errors that would
find a causal connection and more tolerant of errors that would fail to
find one. Examples 2 and 4, which suggest respectively that twentynine exposed people have ailment Y (as opposed to twenty
unexposed people), and that five exposed people have ailment Y (as
opposed to two unexposed people), would not be accepted because
the results do not satisfy the conventional standard of statistical
than 1.65, and since the confidence interval does span 0, the result is not statistically
significant (we do not reject the null hypothesis).
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significance.
It is important to note that the conventional standard does not
mean that science usually accepts only results that are ninety-five
percent certain. Statistical significance at the level of p = .05 means
that there is but one chance in twenty that the observed results could
happen by chance. Satisfying the standard means that there is one
chance in twenty (or less) that mere accidental variation would
produce such a result, not that we can be 95% certain that the
outcome (twenty-two out of forty-two observed ailments were caused
by exposure, or sixteen out of thirty-six, as Examples 1 and 3
indicate) is correct. We do not and cannot know that. All we know is
that the observed outcome would rarely be produced by chance
alone, which gives us some reason to believe that the indicated
correlation is correct.
Any suggestion, however, that the
conventional standard produces results of which we are ninety-five
72
percent certain is false.
Hence, it still needs to be said, it would make no sense to suggest
that the civil justice system should accept results that are statistically
significant at, say, the level p = .40 since such results leave us sixty
percent certain of the conclusion, thus easily satisfying the notion of
a preponderance of the evidence. Suggestions of this sort are close
akin to the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” to which courts and lawyers
sometimes fall prey. That fallacy equates the inverse of a scarcity
factor with the probability of guilt: “The evidence shows that only 1 in
1000 randomly-chosen people would have a DNA profile like the one
found in the defendant’s blood and in the blood at the crime scene,
so we must conclude that the probability is 99.9% that defendant is
guilty.” It is no more the case that p = .05 means that we can be
ninety-five percent sure that the indicated correlation exists than it is
the case that a scarce sample common to the defendant and the
crime scene makes for near-certainty that defendant is guilty. Of
course it is possible to make a link between the one-in-twenty
probability of reaching the observed outcome by chance and the
probability of actual cause. Likewise, it is possible to link the “1 in
1000 randomly-chosen people” probability to the probability that
defendant was at the crime scene. Doing so, however, involves use of
Bayes’ Theorem, which brings new complications and raises the

72

See David W. Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation,
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191, 208-09 (2001) (there is “no convenient way to
translate the .05 p-value into a ninety-five percent confidence that the fact probability
is correct,” in part because that value “assumes that the hypothesis is true” and “does
not measure whether it is true”) [hereinafter Barnes, Too Many Probabilities].
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serious problem of assigning a prior probability to the point in issue.
Now the argument that Daubert is leading courts mistakenly to
require of statistical outcomes the same level of significance that
scientists normally require proceeds in this way: This strong scientific
bias may be appropriate in the setting of science, but not in the
setting of civil litigation. Science observes this strong bias because
science can afford it. Science works incrementally and has “forever”
to get it right. Here is the way that one modern text in statistics
explains the strong scientific bias:
We want α to be small because Type I errors are expensive
for the scientific (and the human) enterprise. Suppose, for
example, we . . . report in a journal that doses of vitamin B12
increase IQ. That will be an error that we made in good
faith because we had no way of knowing that this particular
result was a type I error . . . . As a result, our readers will
alter their behavior, perhaps focusing on a B12 diet while
ignoring other avenues (such as reading enhancement
programs) that might be effective in raising IQ. Sometime
later, perhaps, someone will conduct many experiments
and find that vitamin B12 has no effect on IQ; that is, they
will demonstrate that we had made a Type I error. Our
readers who believed our earlier report were done a
possibly uncorrectable disservice because they may have
ignored other avenues. To prevent any further damage, we
would want to find and contact the entire readership of our
first report and inform them that our result was mistaken.
That is clearly an expensive and difficult (if not impossible)
thing to do.
In contrast, the same text continues, we do not need as much
protection from Type II errors (β-errors):
Consider an investigator who conducts a single experiment
to demonstrate that does of vitamin B12 increase IQ. After

73

Bayes’ Theorem describes the degree to which an item of evidence, when
expressed as a datum of known frequency, affects one’s prior estimate of the issue on
which the evidence bears. For accounts of Bayes’ Theorem, see David W. Barnes, Too
Many Probabilities, at 208-09, and CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 7.18 (3d ed. 2003). One problem in utilizing Bayes’ Theorem in this
setting (indeed any setting) is that it is necessary to quantify the prior estimate of the
probability before using the theorem to find the new probability, after taking into
account the datum of known frequency. If the prior estimate were .05 (very low
probability of causation), then applying a statistical finding returned at the
conventional level of statistical significance raises the odds to 1:1, meaning
equilibrium, or a .5 probability that the degree of cause indicated by the finding (let
us say 22 out of 42 instances) is true, or in other words even odds that 22 out of 42
instances of ailment Y in the exposed population exposed were caused by agent X.
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the data are collected, she concludes that the null
hypothesis should not be rejected; that is, she concludes that
vitamin B12 has no demonstrable effect on IQ. As a
consequence, the investigator will not report findings in a
journal. Instead, the investigation may be considered an
exploration of a blind alley. She had thought vitamin B12
was effective, but apparently it wasn’t.
If subsequent research indicates that the conclusion of the
original investigation was a Type II error, what is the
expense of that error and who bears it? One major expense
is the time lost in the original investigation, but the bearer
of that expense is the original investigator, not the scientific
community at large. There is no necessity of informing the
community of a previous mistake because there was no
74
report of findings in the first place . . . .
Now, the argument continues, our civil justice system differs
from science in its goals and social purposes. To start with, our civil
justice system does not have unlimited time. We cannot and do not
defer decision in the interest of becoming more certain, and
correlatively we hold that a lawsuit must reach a conclusion now.
Moreover, we must leave the results reached in a lawsuit in place
forever. Our legal system cannot be tentative about its conclusions.
In a sense, our legal system views “getting it right” as less important
than “getting it done.” Equally important, our civil justice system is
premised on the principle that mistakes in denying relief are as
harmful as mistakes in allowing recovery (plaintiff loses when the
evidence is equally balanced only because we need a rule to resolve
75
this case). Thus our civil justice system is neutral as between “false
positives” and “false negatives” (α-errors as opposed to β-errors, Type
I as opposed to Type II errors). For our civil justice system, failing to
74

HURLBURT, supra note 21, at 196 (acknowledging, however, that Type I and
Type II errors can both be costly; citing the example of a Type I error in the form of a
false report that a drug is effective against AIDS, the author recognizes that this error
could have “cruel effects, such as raising false hopes or discontinuing the funding of
some other research”; the author also acknowledges, however, that a Type II error in
“failing to report a drug that is in fact effective” would “also have cruel results,
depriving needy individuals of effective treatment,” concluding that there is “no
statistical answer” to the question which kind of error is more costly; it is “a matter of
complex human judgment”).
75
Obviously criminal cases are another matter. There our law strongly favors
acquittals over convictions if the evidence is in close balance, which is somewhat akin
to the idea of preferring false negatives (such as not finding cause when in fact there
is cause) over false positives (like finding cause where none exists). Some would
argue that the bias of science would be appropriate in discouraging the state’s use of
thin scientific evidence and grotesquely inappropriate in discouraging the defense
use of thin scientific evidence.
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find a cause that exists is as bad as finding one that does not exist.
Hence our civil justice system should not require the level of
statistical significance required by science, with its heavy bias against
false positives.
These differences between law and science do indeed suggest
that we should consider carefully the possibility of accepting results in
lawsuits that scientists are not yet prepared to accept. In this paper, I
am not prepared to stake out a final position on this issue. Frankly,
I’m not sure what the right answer is. However, I do want to address
the question how this argument fits with Daubert, to talk briefly about
who ought to resolve the argument, and to raise some cautionary
points.
First, I think the Daubert framework can accommodate the view
that courts ought to accept scientific evidence that does not satisfy
the conventional standard that scientists require. Daubert recognizes
that the enterprises of law and science differ, and adopts the view that
judges must make their own decision, in context and with reference
to the needs of the legal system, on admitting or excluding evidence
proffered as science. It is true, as some have pointed out in criticizing
Daubert, that there is language suggesting that courts should be more
careful of science than is the professional community that produces
76
science. But given the more basic premise of Daubert that the law
must judge science for its own purposes, I don’t think this language is
a serious obstacle to arguments favoring the admissibility of careful
studies showing, for instance, a causal connection between ailment Y
and agent X even if the results do not satisfy the conventional
significance standard.
Second, in this symposium Professor Cohen suggests that a
scientist who has evidence indicating, for example, some marginal
correlation between agent X and ailment Y, should be able to testify
77
even if she says the results do not satisfy the conventional standard.
In Professor Cohen’s formulation, the scientist is seen explaining to
the jury that science would not accept the indicated conclusion but
that the scientist herself might do so for purposes of resolving a
question that could not wait. This proposal merits consideration, but
it also raises questions. To begin with, and I think Professor Cohen
76

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97 (noting that scientific conclusions are “subject to
perpetual revision,” and science advances through “broad and wide-ranging
consideration of a multitude of hypotheses” that can “eventually” be thrown out if
wrong, but “[c]onjectures that are probably wrong are of little use” to the law, that
must reach a “quick, final, and binding” judgment”).
77
See Neil Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal
Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943 (2003).
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agrees here, Daubert requires judges to determine what level of
certainty or confidence is high enough to merit consideration by a
jury. It is not up to an expert or a jury to decide whether or not to
accept evidence that does not satisfy the significance standard. More
importantly, telling jurors they can base their verdict on evidence that
science would not accept may not be the right thing to do, and it is
certainly a strange message: In effect, it says that “you may conclude
that defendant caused plaintiff’s cancer even when qualified experts
think the case is unproved.” It is even questionable whether a
scientist would feel comfortable (or able to comply with the oath
required of witnesses) if she testified that while she does not
professionally accept the indicated conclusion, she might personally do
for purposes of resolving a lawsuit.
Third, how clear is it that differences between the agendas of
science and law justify applying a much more lenient standard to
science offered as proof in litigation? It is true that in any one lawsuit
there is but one chance to get it right, but it is certainly not true that
society as a whole, operating through the legal system, has but one
chance. When apparent toxic agent X appears, the system provides
many opportunities to resolve the question whether agent X causes
ailment Y, and the common-law method of building step by step on
experience actually bears some resemblance to the scientific method
of moving incrementally and withholding judgment until proof
comes that is persuasive. On the other side of the ledger, it is not
true that the decision in one case affects only that case. Particularly
with medicines and other substances believed to have toxic effect,
every court judgment has ripple effects, encouraging or discouraging
parallel suits and settlements, and sometimes having legal impacts on
78
later judgments. Hence errors made in the judicial system, whether
favoring claimants or defendants, can produce additional errors as
lawyers, claimants, and defendants react to them.
Perhaps equally importantly, it is not really the case that our
legal system is “neutral” with respect to errors. In single cases we may
be “neutral” as between errors favoring claimants and errors favoring
defendants, but we are not neutral in aggregate on such points. It is in
part because courts recognize the perils of being wrong in huge cases
that we have a series of decisions in the federal system that cut back
78

For well-known reasons, new claimants are not collaterally estopped by
judgments won by the same defendant against prior claimants, and usually new
claimants cannot take advantage of collateral estoppel against a defendant stemming
from defendant’s prior loss on similar claims. But decisions admitting or excluding
scientific proof, or holding it sufficient or insufficient, are likely to have stare decisis
effects in later suits.
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on the use of class suits to resolve mass tort cases. Even on the
supposition that toxic exposure cases are litigated individually,
wrongly finding for the plaintiff would have considerable collateral
effect, in likely reactions by the defendant and resultant changes in
the availability of products. On the supposition that toxic exposure
cases are litigated in aggregate fashion, these collateral effects are
even clearer and more pronounced.
Finally, I want to suggest that the apparent caution of science
may not be quite what it seems. The conventional standard, after all,
is just numbers—just the product of analysis of the quantification of
data. Behind the numbers are more and real uncertainties—the ones
that go with designing tests, selecting cohorts, trying to eliminate
differences apart from the factor in issue that might account for
observed differences. Part of the reason science insists on impressive
numbers may be the recognition that it is hard or impossible to
eliminate confounding variables, and that even promising results
might not be replicable. To the extent such apprehensions underlie
the insistence on high numbers, the conventions of science are not
conservative. And there is an additional factor to consider, which is
that scientists (like the rest of us) want to be noticed, and have an
incentive to maximize the importance of their findings, which
suggests that the high conventional standard for statistical
significance acts as a counterbalance against self-serving human
motivations that are in play not only among lawyers and politicians,
80
but among scientists too, and indeed the whole human species.
79

See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (disapproving
settlement of asbestos claims, largely on the basis of concern over adequate
representation); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (refusing to allow
certification of nationwide settlement class in asbestos case, largely on basis of
concerns over adequate representation and because remedies under consideration
cannot be created judicially and require legislative consideration); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to certify class in suit
against maker of blood solids, largely because of reluctance to stake future of
defendants on outcome of single trial).
80
See, e.g., Lena Williams, Stalking the Elusive Healthy Diet; In Scientific Studies,
Seeking the Truth in a Vast Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at C1 (Harvard
epidemiologist comments that epidemiology is “a crude and inexact science,” and
that “[e]ighty percent of cases are almost all hypotheses,” and that epidemiologists
“tend to overstate findings, either because we want attention or more grant money”).
See also Robert L. Park, The Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Science, 49 CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. 21, Jan. 31, 2003, at B20 (as “warning signs,” listing the fact that the scientist
“pitches the claim directly to the media,” that she says “a powerful establishment is
trying to suppress” her work, that the effect is “at the very limit of detection,” listing
“anecdotal” evidence, stressing that the belief has “endured for centuries,” that the
discoverer has “worked in isolation,” and that “new laws of nature” are required to
understand the discovery).

2003

DAUBERT ASKS THE RIGHT QUESTIONS

1019

IV. DAUBERT CAN BE IMPROVED: APPELLATE REVIEW MADE REAL
This paper defends the Daubert approach, but one troubling
aspect of Daubert can and should be fixed. That is the misplaced
emphasis on the discretion of trial judges, which appears particularly
in the Court’s two follow-up decisions in the Daubert line. Indeed, it is
at least possible to speculate that the sequence in which Daubert,
Joiner, and Kumho Tire were decided has much to do with the growth
in the emphasis on discretion. The idea is hardly mentioned in
Daubert itself, but it gained prominence in Joiner partly because the
Ninth Circuit had adopted an implausible rule that trial judges have
less discretion to exclude than to admit evidence proffered as science
(the antidote was to hold that judges have discretion either way), and
it made further gains in Kumho Tire because the project in that case
entailed explaining how the standard for science could be applied
usefully to experiential expertise (where a measure of discretion
81
seems essential if the scheme is going to work at all).
I concur with commentators who say Daubert should be
implemented by inviting appellate courts to take a close look at
rulings by a trial court admitting or excluding evidence offered as
82
science. Having become accustomed to the refrain among federal
appellate courts that they accord deference to trial court decisions
applying Daubert, I was surprised to learn that nine states and the
District of Columbia instruct appellate courts to review rulings
admitting or excluding evidence presented as science by applying a de
83
novo standard. Some decisions apply this rigorous standard only to
81

In describing the gatekeeping function in Daubert, it is singular that the Court
made no reference to discretion. By my count, the Court mentioned discretion ten
times in describing this function in Joiner (making many additional passing
references to the term), and six times in the same context in Kumho Tire. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 594 (mentioning that its standards are “flexible”); General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-47 (1997) (repeatedly stressing discretion); Kumho Tire, 526
U.S. at 151 (repeatedly stressing discretion, and pointedly saying that judge “must
have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s reliability” that it
has “when it decides whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable”)
(emphasis in original).
82
See David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and
Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997) (for ordinary decisions to admit evidence, where
preliminary facts “depend on the testimony of witnesses,” appellate deference is
warranted, but scientific evidence is “quite different,” and the trial judge is not in a
“preferred position” in evaluating it). See also Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing
Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047, 1065 (2003) (appellate courts
should play more of a role in reviewing Daubert issues than Joiner suggests).
83
I looked at modern decisions from all fifty states, most of which endorse an
abuse-of-discretion standard. But a de novo standard has been adopted in Arizona,
Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Oklahoma, and
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia. See generally Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615
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the basic question whether the theory and method are valid—or in
Frye terms, to the proxy question whether they are generally
accepted—and leave related questions like “helpfulness” under FRE
702 for the trial judge to decide under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.
There are four reasons for preferring a more exacting standard
in review.
First, issues relating to the validity of theories and techniques
transcend the facts of individual cases. This observation applies, for
example, to the question whether DNA profiling can reliably identify
a blood or fluid sample as having very likely come from one person or
another (the validity of the theory), to the question whether
particular methods of analysis (such as RFLP, PCR, and STR)
accurately measure the attributes of blood or fluid, and whether a
particular laboratory protocol adequately guards against missteps and
84
laboratory error.
It applies to the question whether proffered
N.W.2d 800, 814-15 (Minn. 2000) (whether proffered expertise satisfies state’s FryeMack “general acceptance” standard “is a question of law that we review de novo,” but
questions of “foundational reliability” are reviewed under “abuse of discretion”
standard, as are matters of witness qualification); Kuhn v. Sandos Pharm. Corp., 14
P.3d 1170, 1179 (Kan. 2000) (adopting de novo standard of review for proof of
medical causation); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 P.3d 596 (Or. 2000)
(rejecting argument that appellate court should accord deference to trial court’s
decision on scientific validity, and concluding that the issue is reviewed as for “errors
of law”); Hadden v. State, 690 S.2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) (review of Frye issues is de
novo); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 619 (N.J. 1995) (in applying Frye standard,
question whether scientific community generally accepts a method or test “can
transcend a particular dispute,” and to the extent that Frye focuses on “issues other
than a witness’s credibility or qualifications, deference to the trial court is less
appropriate”); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 331 (Okla. 1995) (decision by trial court
to admit novel scientific evidence should be subject to “an independent, thorough
review,” and appellate court should “not simply ask whether an abuse of discretion
was committed”); State v. Tankersley, 956 P.2d 486, 464 (Az. 1994) (rejecting Daubert
and staying with Frye, and announcing that Frye issues are subject to de novo review);
Schultz v. States, 664 A.2d 60, 64 (Md. App. 1994) (question of reliability of scientific
technique “does not vary according to the circumstances of each case,” so it is
inappropriate to apply abuse of discretion standard on review); State v. Cauthron,
846 P.2d 502, 505 (Wash. 1993) (stating that court would “review the trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude novel scientific evidence de novo”); United States v.
Porter, 618 A.3d 629, 634 (D.C. 1992) (questions of general acceptance of new
scientific techniques invite court “to establish the law of the jurisdiction for future
cases,” so court would “engage in a broad review”).
84
The initials cited above refer to three of the more common methods for
conducting DNA profiling.
RFLP refers to “restriction fragment length
polymorphism,” and it is the first broadly useful approach that made its way into
courtroom use. PCR refers to “polymerase chain reaction,” a later development that
allowed small samples to be “extended” so that the inevitable consumption of such
materials in laboratory testing did not destroy the whole sample. The drawback of
PCR was that it could only extend some of the attributes of the original sample, so
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statistical proof should satisfy the standard that scientists would
require, to the question whether differential diagnosis can or cannot,
standing alone, prove specific cause, to the question whether animal
studies of any particular drug or chemical can prove causation in the
human population, and to the question whether similarities between
the chemical structures of a particular drug or other substance, on
the one hand, and some other agent known to cause certain
consequences, such as disease, on the other hand, can prove
causation. Questions of this magnitude need steadier guidance than
the abuse-of-discretion standard provides, and the answers that courts
reach should be applied in similar cases, rather than left to vary with
the differing views of trial judges exercising discretion.
Second, appellate courts are better situated than trial courts to
resolve such questions. To start with, three or more minds are likely
to do better than one in appraising such technical issues. And
appellate review goes forward in a setting less subject to severe
schedule pressures. Furthermore, Daubert issues are likely to benefit
from thorough appellate briefings. And appellate review can involve
consultation with technical materials and expert advice by means of
amicus briefs or affidavits, or even live testimony. Reviewing courts
can even take judicial notice of technical books, articles, and other
85
materials. Some sense of proportion is clearly warranted: It is one
thing to supplement the arguments and briefs of counsel with
references to additional material, and another thing to decide the
case on grounds never considered by the lawyers who briefed the case
without giving them any opportunity for input.
Third, the Daubert standard needs elaboration in the variety of
settings in which it is to apply, and trial judges need help and
guidance beyond that provided by the standards themselves. The
problem of causation in toxic tort cases is a prime area in which
appellate courts could play useful roles, and in which trial courts
clearly want and need guidance.
There is of course one countervailing concern, and that is that

testing could not be as extensive. STR, or “short tandem repeats,” is a still more
recent development. See generally Shreck, 22 P.3d at 73 (describing these techniques).
85
FRE 201 governs only judicial notice of “adjudicative” facts, and most technical
material that might be noticed in this setting involves “evaluative” facts utilized by
courts in their attempts to formulate wise rules of law. The fact that FRE 201 does
not cover evaluative facts does not mean they cannot be noticed. Instead, the
omission from coverage simply means that judicial notice of evaluative facts is not
regulated by any formal rule. See State v. Jones, 922 P.2d 806, 809 (Wash. 1996) (de
novo review includes “sources outside the record such as scientific literature, law
articles, and the decisions of other jurisdictions”) (applying state’s Frye standard).
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the Daubert standard is both wide-ranging and case-specific. It is wideranging now, if it was not when Daubert was decided, because
amended FRE 702 indicates that judges are to consider “principles
and methods” and the sufficiency of underlying “facts or data,” and
also the question whether the expert “has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts,” and Kumho Tire makes it clear that the
focus is the “task at hand,” as Professors Denbeaux and Risinger
86
remind us. To the extent that the admissibility decision actually
focuses, for example, on the question whether a particular laboratory
protocol was or was not followed in the case at hand, or on the
question whether a particular lapse or discrepancy in the data
materially affected the outcome, some degree of deference to the
decision of the trial judge is in order. It is with larger questions,
including those of theory and technique, and the appropriateness of
the technique to the issue being decided, that closer scrutiny is
warranted.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Daubert changed the relationship
between law and science. Critics have argued that judges cannot act
constructively in the way that Daubert envisions, but there are good
reasons to think that indeed judges can rise to the task. Critics have
argued as well that Daubert has led to the exclusion of too much
scientific evidence, particularly in toxic tort cases, and have adopted
restrictive rules that are out of place and, in the federal system,
infringe on the Erie doctrine. But Daubert does not require adoption
of such rules, and the cases show that courts are in fact working hard
in very challenging areas to achieve appropriate outcomes in
appraising science. The Erie doctrine is not offended by federal
efforts to implement a sufficiency standard.
Critics have also argued that Daubert misconceives science, and
the relationship between law and science. But the dualism visible in
Daubert’s account of science is also visible in the accounts of
philosophers and historians of science, and the task is to reconcile
notions of objectivity and subjectivity in scientific undertakings. The
truly difficult question whether scientific evidence proffered in civil
86

See amended FRE 702 (described in the text accompanying note 51, supra); see
also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 154 (stressing that the question for the court is not “the
reasonableness in general” of a particular technique, but “the reasonableness of using
such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the
expert testimony was directly relevant”) (emphasis in original); Mark P. Denbeaux &
Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the
Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV __ (upcoming in Fall 2003).
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cases should achieve a level of certainty that scientists themselves
would require has not yet been resolved, but Daubert leaves room
either to require that level or to admit scientific evidence on a lesser
showing of significance. Which choice should be made here remains
open to debate.
In the federal system, reviewing courts speak highly of the
discretion that trial judges have in applying the Daubert standards, but
a handful of states follow a different approach in allowing reviewing
courts to appraise claims of error in applying Daubert on a de novo
basis. These courts are doing the right thing, as trial judges need
more extensive appellate guidance in handling science in civil cases
under the Daubert standard.

